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8	UNITED STATE	S DISTRICT COURT
9		ICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	LOS ANGELES DIVISION	
11	JUDY ANNE MIKOVITS,	Case No. CV14-08909 SVW (PLA)
12	Plaintiff,	KENNETH HUNTER'S AND GREG
13		PARI'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS
14	V.	PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
15	ADAM GARCIA, JAMIE MCGUIRE, RICHARD GAMMICK, GEOFF DEAL	N, AND 12(b)(6); SUPPORTING
16	THREE UNIDENTIFIED VENTURA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERRIFFS, F.	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION E OF ROBERT M. DATO
17	HARVEY WHITTEMORE, ANNETTI F. WHITTEMORE, CARLI WEST	
18	KINNE, WHITTEMORE-PETERSON INSTITUTE, a Nevada corporation, UNEVX INC., a Nevada corporation,	(Filed concurrently with affidavits of Kenneth Hunter and Greg Pari)
19	MICHAEL HILLERBY, KENNETH	Date: April 13, 2015 [to be vacated]
20	HUNTER, GREG PARI and VINCENT LOMBARDI,	Judge: Hon. Paul L. Abrams,
21	Defendants.	Magistrate Judge
22		
23	TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR CO	UNSEL OF RECORD:
24	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants Dr. Kenneth Hunter and Dr. Greg	
25	Pari will and hereby do move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Judy Anne Mikovits's	
26	Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) on	
27	the following grounds:	
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Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari are Nevada residents, do not have sufficient
 minimum contacts with California, and have not purposefully availed themselves of
 the benefits and protections of California. Therefore, Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari are
 not subject to personal jurisdiction in California.

5 2. The statute of limitations bars all of Plaintiff's claims in the6 Complaint.

7 3. The Complaint fails to state any claim for relief against Dr. Hunter or
8 Dr. Pari because no wrongful conduct is alleged as to those defendants.

9 The Motion is based on this Notice, the Supporting Memorandum, the 10 Declaration of Robert M. Dato, the Affidavits of Kenneth Hunter and Greg Pari, all 11 other pleadings on file with the Court in this matter and on any oral argument that 12 the Court may consider at the hearing on the motion.

Counsel for Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari attempted to meet and confer with
Mikovits pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 on February 11, 2015, but received no
response. See Declaration of Robert M. Dato.

Other defendants in this action have filed their own motions to dismiss. (See, e.g., Dock. Nos. 48, 52, 55.) Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams has issued orders setting forth the time within which to file opposition and reply papers, and indicating that the Court will take the matter under submission without oral argument. (See, e.g., Dock. Nos. 51, 54, 59.) Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari bring the present motion and request the Court for a similar order, vacating the hearing date.

23 DATED: February 18, 2015

BUCHALTER NEMER A Professional Corporation

By: <u>/s/ Robert M. Dato</u> Robert M. Dato Sarah A. Syed

Attorneys for Defendants KENNETH HUNTER and GREG PARI

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

By her Complaint, Plaintiff Judy Anne Mikovits ("Mikovits") seeks to hold
the defendants liable for an alleged unlawful arrest and related false imprisonment
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Notwithstanding the lack of merit in Mikovits's allegations, this Court does 6 not have personal jurisdiction over individual Defendants Dr. Kenneth Hunter ("Dr. 7 Hunter") and Dr. Greg Pari ("Dr. Pari"). Neither Dr. Hunter not Dr. Pari have 8 sufficient "minimum contacts" for this Court to have general jurisdiction over them. 9 Nor have Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari purposely availed themselves of the benefits and 10protections of the state of California for this Court to have special jurisdiction over 11 him. Accordingly, the exercise of jurisdiction over Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari would 12 offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and they should be 13 dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(2). 14

Even if this Court were to exercise jurisdiction over Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari, Mikovits fails to state a claim for relief against them. None of Mikovits's "Counts" even identify Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari as engaging in any unlawful conduct. They are only mentioned 4 times each within the 54 paragraphs of allegations in the Complaint. Yet there are no substantiated allegations in the Complaint of any wrongdoing by either one. This warrants dismissal pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).

On either of these two bases, the Court should grant this motion and dismiss
Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari from the case with prejudice.

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II. <u>ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT REGARDING DR. HUNTER</u> <u>AND DR. PARI</u>

Putting aside the caption and introduction, Mikovits's Complaint mentionsDr. Hunter and Dr. Pari only four times each.

27 Mikovits first identifies Dr. Hunter as a Professor of Immunology at "UNR
28 School of Medicine" and "Chairman of the Scientific Advisory Board of WPL

[sic]." Complaint ¶16. Mikovits first identifies Dr. Pari as a "Professor of 1 Immunology at UNR," "Chairman of that Department" and "member of the 2 Scientific Advisory Board of WPI." Complaint ¶17. Mikovits then asserts that Dr. 3 Hunter and Dr. Pari were "acting in active conspiracy" with Defendants Adam 4 Garcia, Jaime McGuire and Richard Gammick to "cause the false imprisonment of 5 Plaintiff." Complaint ¶20. The Complaint does not make any allegations as to Dr. 6 7 Hunter's or Dr. Pari's involvement in the alleged conspiracy or how they conspired 8 with the other defendants. Next, the Complaint alleges that Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari 9 were Mikovits's supervisors at UNR. Complaint ¶25. Finally, Mikovits alleges that Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari were "consulted" regarding her termination. Complaint 10¶30. 11

There are the only allegations about Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari in the Complaint.
Neither Dr. Hunter nor Dr. Pari are referenced or discussed in Mikovits's allegations regarding her research at Whittemore-Peterson Institute ("WPI")
(Complaint III 26-29) or the allegations regarding Mikovits's arrest (Complaint III
31-33). Likewise, although Mikovits's Complaint contains six "Counts," none of these "Counts" contain any factual allegations against or seek any relief from Dr.
Hunter or Dr. Pari. Complaint III 34-54.

19 III. <u>MIKOVITS'S COMPLAINT AGAINST DR. HUNTER AND DR. PARI</u> 20 <u>MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE CALIFORNIA LACKS</u> 21 <u>PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THEM</u>

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a defendant to seek
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff has the burden of
demonstrating that personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant. *Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy*, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). This includes coming "forward
with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction." *Scott v. Breeland*, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986); see also *Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.*, 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004).

A. <u>California Does Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Dr. Hunter</u> <u>Or Dr. Pari</u>

3 The starting point in the analysis of personal jurisdiction issues in federal cases is the "long arm" statute in effect in the state in which the federal court is 4 5 Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft, 521 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1974). located. California's long-arm statute authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction on 6 any basis not inconsistent with the constitutions of California and the United States. 7 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §410.10; Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 8 9 (2002). Accordingly, the California jurisdictional analysis is co-extensive with 10 federal due process requirements. Id.

11 Due process protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 12 13 "contacts, ties, or relations." Vons Cos. Ins. v. Seabeast Foods, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 14 434, 445 (1996) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-472 15 (1985)). In the absence of the traditional bases for personal jurisdiction — namely, presence, domicile or consent — jurisdiction comports with due process only where 16 the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the 17 18 maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 19 substantial justice." Vons, 14 Cal.4th at 444-445; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984). 20

21 Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants may be general or specific. 22 Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 445; Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 475, 477-478, 487. 23 The precise standards for general and specific jurisdiction are set forth below. 24 Notably, "when a defendant moves to quash out-of-state service for lack of personal 25 jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Penn. Health & Life Ins. Guar. Assoc. v. Superior 26Court, 22 Cal.App.4th 477, 480 (1994). Moreover, [plaintiff's] burden must be met 27 28 by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documents; an unverified

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complaint may not be considered as supplying the necessary facts." *Nobel Farms*, *Inc. v. Pasero*, 106 Cal.App.4th 654, 657-658 (2003) (emphasis added); *Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar International Inc.*, 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.
1977) (plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction
and cannot "simply rest on the bare allegations of the complaint, but rather [is
obliged] to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal
jurisdiction).

8 Here, Mikovits cannot establish any basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari. Even the bare allegations of the Complaint 9 reveal no contact or action by Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari either in or toward California. 10 None of the traditional bases for personal jurisdiction apply and both of these 11 defendants lack sufficient continuous and systematic contacts with California for 12 this Court to exercise general jurisdiction. Finally, neither Dr. Hunter nor Dr. Pari 13 have acted in such a way as to create specific jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 14 exercise of jurisdiction would offend the traditional notions of fair play and 15 substantial justice, and Mikovits's action against Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari should be 16 dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 17

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1. <u>No Traditional Bases For Jurisdiction Exist</u>

The three traditional bases for personal jurisdiction are: (i) personal service
within the forum state; (ii) domicile; and (iii) consent. *In re Fitzgerald*, 39
Cal.App.4th 1419, 1420 (1995). None of these apply here.

First, neither Dr. Hunter not Dr. Pari were served with process in California.

Second, both Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari are domiciled in Nevada. Declaration
of Kenneth Hunter ("Hunter Decl.") ¶ 2; Declaration of Greg Pari ("Pari Decl.") ¶
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2.

Third, neither Dr. Hunter nor Dr. Pari consented to jurisdiction in California.

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2. <u>No General Jurisdiction Exists</u>

To prove general jurisdiction, Mikovits must show that Dr. Hunter and Dr.

1	Pari engaged in "continuous and systematic business contacts that approximate
2	physical presence in the forum state." Elkman v. National States Ins. Co., 173
3	Cal.App.4th 1305, 1315 (2009); Schwarzenegger, supra, 374 F.3d at 801. This
4	"exacting standard" requires extremely significant forum contacts. Id.; see also
5	Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 475, 487 (the non-resident's contacts with
6	California must be "substantial, continuous and systematic"). Factors to consider
7	include whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the
8	state, serves the state's markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a
9	license, or is incorporated in the state. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat.
10	Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).
11	a. Neither Dr. Hunter Nor Dr. Pari Have Continuous And
12	Systematic Contacts With California
13	In her Complaint, Mikovits makes no additional allegations to show that
14	either Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari has continuous and systemic contacts with California.
15	Indeed, they do not.
16	• Both Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari are residents of Nevada. Hunter Decl. at
17	¶2; Pari Decl. at ¶2.
18	• Both Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari are employed by the University of
19	Nevada School of Medicine in Reno. Hunter Decl. at ¶2; Pari Decl. at
20	¶2.
21	• Neither Dr. Hunter nor Dr. Pari own any property in California.
22	Hunter Decl. at ¶3; Pari Decl. at ¶3.
23	• Neither Dr. Hunter nor Dr. Pari regularly conduct business or hold a
24	business or professional license in California. Hunter Decl. at ¶4; Pari
25	Decl. at ¶4.
26	• Neither Dr. Hunter nor Dr. Pari has appointed an agent for service of
27	process in California. Hunter Decl. at ¶5; Pari Decl. at ¶5.
28	Given the limited allegations against Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari in the
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Complaint and the facts established in their declarations, Mikovits has not
 demonstrated that Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari have contacts with California so
 substantial, or continuous and systematic, to establish general jurisdiction.

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3. <u>No Specific Jurisdiction Exists</u>

5 Mikovits cannot establish specific jurisdiction over Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari either. California courts apply a three-part test to assess whether the exercise of 6 specific jurisdiction is appropriate: (1) the non-resident defendant has purposefully 7 8 availed herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy arises out of or relates to the 9 defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports 10with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. *Pavlovich*, *supra*, 29 Ca1.4th at 269; Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008); 11 Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 477-478. The plaintiff has the burden of 12 13 "demonstrating facts justifying the existence of jurisdiction." Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 449. Only if the plaintiff meets its burden under the minimum contacts 14 test does the burden then shift to the defendant to show that the exercise of 15 jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. 16

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 a. Neither Dr. Hunter Nor Dr. Pari Purposefully Availed Themselves Of The Benefits of Conducting Business In California

To purposefully avail oneself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, a defendant must have "performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business with the forum state." *Goehring v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal.App.4th, 894, 907 (1998). The requirement of affirmative conduct is designed to safeguard the defendant against being "hauled into court as a result of random, fortuitous or attenuated contacts." *Gray & Co. v. Firestenberg Machinery Co.*, 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990).

The purposeful direction test is satisfied only if a plaintiff can prove the defendant: (1) committed an intentional act; (2) that was expressly aimed at the

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forum state; and (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered
 in the forum state. *Pavlovich, supra*, 29 Cal.4th at 270-271; *Schwarzenegger*,
 supra, 374 F.3d at 805. Notably, mere foreseeability of injury in the forum state is
 insufficient to justify a finding of purposeful direction. *Pavlovich, supra*, 29
 Cal.4th at 269-277.

6 Here, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations of intentional activity by Dr. 7 Hunter or Dr. Pari directed to California. None of the six "Counts" asserted by 8 Mikovits mention any activity by Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari in California. Complaint 9 **[[34-54**. Neither Dr. Hunter nor Dr. Pari is identified in any paragraph asserting or 10alleging conduct that damaged Mikovits. Complaint ¶¶ 42, 44, 57, 49, 52 & 54. Taking the allegations in the Complaint and the declarations of Dr. Hunter and Dr. 11 12 Pari together, Mikovits cannot demonstrate that either of these defendants 13 committed intentional and damage-causing acts expressly aimed at California.

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b. This Controversy Does Not Arise Out Of Any Forum
 Related Activity By DR. Hunter Or Dr. Pari

As set forth in the declarations of Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari, and based on the allegations in the Complaint, it is clear that the controversy at issue does not arise out of any conduct by these defendants individually, let alone any forum-related conduct.

With respect to the vague allegations that do mention Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari,
neither arise out of any forum related activity by them. Mikovits's allegation that
Defendant Whittemore "consulted with" Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari regarding the
termination of Mikovits's employment, does not allege any conduct *in California*.
Complaint ¶30.¹

25 Similarly, Mikovits's assertion that Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari acted in

¹ Even assuming for the sake of this Motion that such consultation occurred, it presumably took place in Nevada as Plaintiff was employed by Whittemore-Peterson Institute in Nevada (Complaint ¶¶23-24) and both Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari were employed at University of Nevada in Reno, Nevada (Complaint ¶16; Hunter Decl. at ¶2; Pari Decl. at ¶2).

conspiracy with other defendants does not establish personal jurisdiction over Dr. 2 Hunter or Dr. Pari. Complaint ¶20. Despite the allegation of conspiracy, the 3 Complaint is devoid of any allegations regarding these defendants' alleged role in conspiracy or how they conspired with the other defendants, let alone whether the 4 5 alleged conspiracy took place in California.

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The Exercise Of Jurisdiction Over Dr. Hunter And Dr. c. Pari Would Not Comport With "Fair Play And Substantial Justice"

The Court need not reach the issue of whether jurisdiction would be 9 10 reasonable because Mikovits cannot satisfy the other prerequisites for jurisdiction. 11 However, even if it did so, the applicable fairness factors weigh decidedly against 12 jurisdiction. Five factors affect the fairness of jurisdiction: (1) the burden on the 13 defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining 14 relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient 15 resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in 16 furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Vons, supra, 14 Cal. at 476; see 17 also Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 18 1998); Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 477 (including two additional factors: the 19 extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state and the existence of 20an alternative forum). An analysis of these factors compels the conclusion that an exercise of jurisdiction over Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari would offend traditional notions 21 22 of "fair play and substantial justice."

23 First, it is not reasonable to drag Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari across state lines to defend this action in a forum in which they have no contacts. As explained above, 24 25 neither of these defendants has consistent and systematic contacts with nor purposefully availed themselves of California. As such, the burden on Dr. Hunter 26 27 and Dr. Pari is substantial.

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Second, California has no particular interest in an action regarding the

alleged actions of two professors from the University of Nevada School of
 Medicine who are Nevada residents.

Finally, the interest of Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari in not being sued in California
far outweighs Mikovits's interest in obtaining relief against them. Neither Dr.
Hunter nor Dr. Pari engaged in any of the conduct of which Mikovits complains
and should not have been sued in the first place.

7 Accordingly, Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari should be dismissed for lack of8 personal jurisdiction.

9 IV. MIKOVITS'S COMPLAINT AGAINST DR. HUNTER AND DR. PARI 10 MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO STATE A 11 CLAIM AGAINST EITHER OF THEM

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A. Legal Standard On Motion to Dismiss

13 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where it appears that plaintiff can prove 14 no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitled him or her to 15 16 relief. Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 17 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986). Dismissal can be based on a lack of cognizable 18 legal theory or the lack of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. In re U.S. Aggregates, Inc. Securities Litigation, 235 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1068 (N.D. 19 Cal. 2002). 20

21 Although a complaint need only provide a short and plain statement for 22 relief, a plaintiff is obligated to provide more than "labels and conclusions" or a 23 formulaic recitation of elements of a claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 24 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold & Easement in the Cloverly Subterranean Geological 25 Formation, 524 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of complaint 26 27 where complaint failed to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 28

BUCHALTER NEMER A Professional Corporation Irvine accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v.
 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, factual allegations must be enough to raise
 a right to relief that rises above a "speculative level." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555.

Furthermore, courts are not required to cull a "tangled web" of allegations to
determine whether a plaintiff has articulated a meritorious claim. See, e.g., *United States v. Dunkel*, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). Nor is it the court's duty to
rewrite a plaintiff's complaint. *Peterson v. Atlanta Housing Authority*, 998 F.2d
904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993) (complaint devoid of reference to any injury inflicted on
plaintiff by defendant, which fails to give "fair notice" of claim and grounds on
which it rests) (*quoting Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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B. <u>Mikovits's Claims Are Barred By The Statute Of Limitations</u>

There is no federal statute of limitation for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 13 1983. As such, federal courts must borrow the state personal injury statute of 14 limitation to determine if a Section 1983 claim is time barred. *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 15 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); *Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). For purposes of 16 the present case, California's two-year personal injury residual statute of limitations 17 applies. *Owens v. Okure*, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989); see also *Canatella v. Van De* 18 *Kamp*, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-1133 (9th Cir. 2007).²

The crux of Mikovits's claims are that she was unlawfully arrested and
detained on November 18, 2011. Complaint ¶¶ 31 and 32. The Complaint contains
no allegations of any conduct occurring after November 2011. However, Mikovits
did not file her complaint until November 17, 2014, approximately three years after
the alleged events occurred. This is one year too late, making Mikovits's claims
time-barred.

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- ²⁷ ¹ The Nevada residual statute of limitation under N.R.S. 11.190(4)(e) is also two years. For that reason, Mikovits's Section 1983 suit would also be barred, were Nevada law deemed applicable, and subject to dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

1	C. <u>The Complaint Fails To State A Claim Against Dr. Hunter And</u>
2	Dr. Pari
3	Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari must be dismissed because the Complaint contains
4	no allegations of wrongful conduct by either of them. Although Mikovits's
5	Complaint contains six "Counts," none of these "Counts" contain any factual
6	allegations against or seek any relief from Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari. Complaint ¶¶ 34-
7	54.
8	As explained above, the Complaint mentions Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari only
9	four times each:
10	• Paragraph 16 states that Dr. Hunter is a Professor of Immunology at
11	"UNR School of Medicine" and was "Chairman of the Scientific
12	Advisory Board of WPL [sic]."
13	• Paragraph 17 states that Dr. Pari is a "Professor of Immunology at
14	UNR," "Chairman of that Department" and was "member of the
15	Scientific Advisory Board of WPI."
16	• Paragraph 20 asserts that Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari were "acting in
17	active conspiracy" with Defendants Garcia, McGuire and Gammick to
18	"cause the false imprisonment of Plaintiff."
19	• Paragraph 25 of the Complaint alleges that Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari
20	were Mikovits's supervisors at UNR.
21	• Paragraph 30 alleges that Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari were "consulted"
22	regarding Mikovits's termination.
23	While a Complaint is not required to have "detailed factual allegations,"
24	there must be enough facts alleged to support a claim that is "plausible on its face."
25	Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, a Complaint must offer "more than an
26	unadorned, the -defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id.
27	Here, except for the allegation of conspiracy, Mikovits does not allege any
28	wrongdoing by Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari whatsoever. And the mere allegation that
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these two defendants participated in a conspiracy, without any detail on their role in
 such conspiracy, falls short of what is required of a complaint under the Federal
 Rules. *Id.* at 678-79; *Twombly, supra*, 550 U.S. at 544. A single unsupported
 allegation that Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari participated in a conspiracy is exactly the type
 of pleading that the Supreme Court rejected in deciding *Iqbal*.

Absent any factual allegations of wrongdoing by or seeking any relief from
Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari, the Complaint does not state a claim for relief against these
defendants.

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D. <u>Neither Dr. Hunter Nor Dr. Pari Were Acting Under Color Of</u> <u>State Law</u>

Even if the Court were to find that the allegations against Dr. Hunter and Dr.
Pari are sufficient, they are certainly insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim
against them.

Under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Mikovits can only seek relief against a defendant 14 who has acted under the color of state law, i.e. where he or she has "exercised 15 power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 16 wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 17 18 49 (1988). Generally, the mere existence of an employment relationship between 19 the state and an individual is an insufficient basis upon which to transform any and all employee acts into "state action" for the purposes of section 1983. Johnson v. 2021 Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 1997); Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991)("[G]enerally, a public employee acts 22 under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his 23 24 responsibilities pursuant to state law").

While Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari are professors at the University of Nevada School of Medicine in Reno, the alleged wrongful actions were not taken under color of state law because Mikovits does not allege that those actions were in any way related to the performance of Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari's duties as public

employees. Notably, Mikovits does not even allege that they were acting within the 1 2 course and scope of their employment at all relevant times. That they were her 3 supervisors or that they were consulted regarding her termination from WPI (and 4 not from the University of Nevada School of Medicine) are not actions taken under 5 the "pretense of law." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945).

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With respect to Mikovits's conspiracy claim, when a private party (as Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari must be considered here given the allegations) conspires with 7 8 state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights, the private party can be 9 deemed to be acting under color of state law. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 10 (1984); Franklin v. Fox. 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). To prove such a conspiracy, "the [plaintiff] must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to 11 12 violate constitutional rights. To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need 13 not know the exact details of the plan, but each must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 14 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-1541 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, for the purposes of a 15 FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Mikovits is subject to heightened pleadings 16 17 standards requiring her to offer more than mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy, which, as a matter of law, are "insufficient to state a claim of 18 19 conspiracy." Simmons, supra, 318 F.3d at 1161; Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 20254 F.3d 772, 783-784 (9th Cir. 2001); Price, supra, 939 F.2d at 708-709. "Vague 21 and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 22 sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 23 268 (9th Cir. 1982); accord, Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 24 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, none of the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to convert Dr. 25 26 Hunter or Dr. Pari into conspirators under color of law for purposes of a section 1983 claim. The Complaint contains only the scant conclusion that Dr. Hunter and 27 28 Dr. Pari engaged in an "active conspiracy" with Defendants Garcia, McGuire and

Gammick. Complaint ¶20. There are no facts demonstrating a meeting of the
 minds or a shared common objective. This is nothing more than "vague and
 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations," which, as a
 matter of law, "are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." *Ivey, supra*,
 673 F.2d at 268.

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E. <u>Alternatively, Dr. Hunter And Dr. Pari Are Entitled To Qualified</u> <u>Immunity</u>

8 Even if Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari were considered to be acting under color of 9 law, they are nonetheless protected by qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald 10(1982) 457 U.S. 800, 816, the United States Supreme Court held "that government 11 officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 12 13 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." As reiterated by the Ninth Circuit, "regardless of whether [a] constitutional 14 15 violation occurred, the officer should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established' or the officer could have reasonably believed that his 16 particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th 17 Cir. 1991). 18

19 Importantly, the entitlement recognized in *Harlow* "is an immunity from suit 20rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is 21 effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mueller v. Auker, 22 576 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 685 ("The 23 basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns 24 of litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery.'"); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) ("we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving 25 immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation"). 26

As discussed below, Mikovits's Complaint should further be dismissed as toDr. Hunter and Dr. Pari because they are entitled to qualified immunity.

2 3

Mikovits Has Failed To Identify Any Alleged Constitutional Or Statutory Right Purportedly Violated By Dr. Hunter Or Dr. Pari

Mikovits's Complaint is devoid of non-conclusory factual allegations 4 5 sufficient to state a valid claim for relief against Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari. The few specific references to either of these defendants merely allege that (i) they were 6 7 purportedly Mikovits's "supervisor" to the extent she was considered an "adjunct 8 professor" at UNR, and (ii) that Defendant Annette Whittemore "actively consulted 9 with" them, among others, regarding Mikovits's termination from WPI. Complaint 10**11** 25, 30. Neither of these allegations identify any violation of a clearly established 11 right belonging to Mikovits. See C.B. v. City of Sonora, 730 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 12 2013) ("Qualified immunity analysis consists of two steps," the first of which asks 13 "whether the facts the plaintiff alleges make out a violation of a constitutional right.").³ With regards to Mikovits's allegation that Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari 14 engaged in active conspiracy with Defendants, Garcia, McGuire and Gammick 15 (Complaint ¶20), as previously explained, this allegation is devoid of any factual 16 17 support that would warrant a finding that Dr. Hunter or Dr. Pari violated a 18 constitutional or statutory right belonging to Mikovits.

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2. <u>Mikovits Has Failed To Allege That No Reasonable Official</u> Would Have Believed That The Purported "Active

Consultation" Was Lawful

³ Even if Mikovits's Complaint could be stretched to somehow suggest that the alleged "active consultation" concerning WPI's decision to terminate Mikovits's employment was wrongful—which is not alleged—Mikovits has not alleged, nor can she likely demonstrate, that any clearly established constitutional or statutory right to continued employment existed or was violated. "All employees in Nevada are presumed to be at-will employees." *Am. Bank Stationary v. Farmer*, 106 Nev. 698, 701 (1990).

1 right violated was so clearly established that no reasonable official could have 2 believed that Dr. Pari's alleged "active consultation" with WPI was lawful. See 3 Romero, supra, 931 F.2d at 627 ("regardless of whether [a] constitutional violation occurred, the officer should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 4 'clearly established' or the officer could have reasonably believed that his particular 5 conduct was lawful.") (emphasis added). In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has stated 6 7 that in order "to attach liability '[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that right."" 8 Mueller, supra, 576 F.3d at 993.⁴ However, Mikovits's Complaint is devoid of any 9 suggestion that it would or should have been apparent to a reasonable official that 1011 the alleged "active consultation" regarding WPI's decision to terminate Mikovits's 12 employment was unlawful. See Anderson v. Creighton (1987) 483 U.S. 635, 640 13 ("in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the alleged conduct] must be apparent."). Accordingly, based upon the allegations contained in the Complaint, 14 15 Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari are entitled to qualified immunity.

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V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Based on the foregoing, Dr. Hunter and Dr. Pari respectfully request that the
Court grant this motion and dismiss the Complaint in its entirety with prejudice as
to these defendants.

20 DATED: February 18, 2015

BUCHALTER NEMER A Professional Corporation

By: <u>/s/ Robert M. Dato</u> Robert M. Dato Sarah A. Syed

Attorneys for Defendants KENNETH HUNTER and GREG PARI

⁴ See also *id.* at 992, 994 (noting that courts apply an objective standard in considering this prong of the qualified immunity analysis, and that "the inquiry 'must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.") (Citation omitted.)

BUCHALTER NEMER A Professional Corporation Irvine

DECLARATION OF ROBERT M. DATO

I, the undersigned Robert M. Dato, declare as follows:

I am an attorney at law admitted to this Court. I am employed by
 Buchalter Nemer, PC, counsel of record for defendants Adam Garcia, Jaime
 McGuire, Kenneth Hunter, and Greg Pari in this action. I have personal knowledge
 of the facts contained in this declaration and am competent to testify about them.

7 2. On February 11, 2015, I sent the following e-mail to Plaintiff Judy
8 Mikovits at the e-mail address she listed on her Complaint, jamikovits@me.com:

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"Ms. Mikovits:

"This email serves as meet and confer efforts with you pursuant to
Central District Local Rule 7-3 as to defendants Garcia, McGuire, Hunter and Pari
We have reviewed your complaint and have found various issues that warrant
dismissal of these defendants in this action. If these defendants are not dismissed
from this action, they will move to dismiss your claims pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and/or 12(b)(6) as follows:

16 "1. The Central District of California does not have personal
17 jurisdiction over defendants Hunter or Pari. Neither Hunter nor Pari have the
18 minimum contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction nor have they
19 purposefully availed themselves of California for purposes of special jurisdiction.

"2. None of the complaint's six counts identify Hunter or Pari in
any wrongful conduct. In fact, other than being identified as party defendants, the
only two allegations against them are that they were consulted regarding
termination and a vague, unsupported assertion that they engaged in active
conspiracy with other defendants. These two allegations are insufficient to state a
claim.

26 "3. The statute of limitations bars all your claims against all of
27 these defendants. With respect to a section 1983 claim, the state personal injury
28 statute of limitations, which in California is two years, applies. All of the alleged

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events occurred on November 18, 2011. The complaint was not filed until
 November 17, 2014, three years later, and one year too late.

"4 Neither Hunter nor Pari were acting under color of state law for 3 purposes of a section 1983 claim. The allegations of a conspiracy are conclusory 4 and do not satisfy pleading requirements. Even if Hunter and Pari were somehow 5 6 acting under color of state law, they along with Garcia and McGuire are all 7 protected by the qualified immunity doctrine. The complaint does not contain any allegations that Hunter or Pari violated any constitutional or statutory right or that 8 9 no reasonable official would have believed that the purported conduct was lawful. 10As to Garcia and McGuire, probable cause, and even arguable probable cause, is a defense to liability for an alleged unlawful arrest. 11

12 "5. The complaint does not comply with the heightened pleading
13 standards set forth in Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
14 allegations of fraud, particularly with respect to count IV, which is essentially a
15 judicial deception claim.


16 "Finally, Defendants Garcia, McGuire, Hunter and Pari also intend to
17 move to strike the complaint's punitive damages claim as it is not pleaded with the
18 requisite specificity demanded by both the United States and California Supreme
19 Courts.

"If you have any questions regarding the above issues or would like to
discuss these matters further, please let me know and we can arrange a time to
discuss. In the alternative, if you intend to oppose these defendants' motions to
dismiss, you may so state in a return e-mail."

3. As of the filing of my clients' motions to dismiss and to strike, I havereceived no response to my e-mail.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States ofAmerica that the foregoing is true and correct.

BUCHALTER NEMER A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION IRVINE



1	PROOF OF SERVICE	
2		
3	I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is at BUCHALTER NEMER, A Professional Corporation, 18400 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800, Irvine, California 92612-0514.	
5	On the date set forth below, I served the foregoing document described as: KENNETH HUNTER'S AND GREG PARI'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION	
7 8	TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULES 12(b)(2) AND 12(b)(6); SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT M. DATO	
9	on all other parties and/or their attorney(s) of record to this action as follows:	
10	SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST	
11	SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST	
12	BY CM/ECF SYSTEM I certify that I caused a copy of the above document to be	
13	served upon the following counsel via the court CM/ECF System on February 18, 2015.	
14	BY MAIL I am readily familiar with the business' practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. The address(es) shown	
15	above is(are) the same as shown on the envelope. The envelope was placed for deposit in the United States Postal Service at Buchalter Nemer in Irvine, California on February 18, 2015. The envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing with first-class prepaid postage on this date following ordinary business practices.	
16		
17		
18 19	I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. Executed on February 18, 2015 at Irvine, California.	
20	Susie Lamarr 671518 Laman	
21	(Signature)	
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28		
BUCHALTER NEMER	BN 17813422v1	
Irvine	PROOF OF SERVICE	

1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – LOS ANGELES DIVISION JUDY ANNE MIKOVITS vs. ADAM GARCIA, et al. CASE NO. CV14-08909 SVW (PLA)
3 4 5	Judy Anne Mikovits 140 Acacia Avenue, Suite 5 Carlsbad, CA 92008 Pro Se
6 7 8	Mary Margaret Kandaras Washoe County District Attorney P. O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520-0027 Attorneys for Defendant Richard Gammick <u>mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us</u>
9 10 11 12 13 14	Brian Warner Hagen Whittemore Law Firm 9432 Double R Boulevard Reno, NV 89501 Attorneys for Defendants F. Harvey Whittemore, Annette F. Whittemore, Carli West Kinne, Whittemore-Peterson Institute, UNEVX, Inc., Michael Hillerby and Vincent Lombardi <u>bwhagen@gmail.com</u>
14 15 16 17 18	James N. Procter II Lisa N. Shyer Jeffrey Held Wisotsky, Procter & Shyer 300 Esplanade Drive, Suite 1500 Oxnard, CA 93036 Attorneys for Defendant Geoff Dean jheld@wps-law.net
19 20	
21	
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28 BUCHALTER NEMER A Professional Corforation Irvine	BN 17813422v1 2 PROOF OF SERVICE