BUCHALTER NEMER A Professional Corporation Robert M. Dato (SBN: 110408) Email: rdato@buchalter.com Sarah A. Syed (SBN: 253534) Email: ssyed@buchalter.com 18400 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800 Irvine, CA 92612-0514 Telephone: (949) 760-1121 Fax: (949) 720-0182 6 Attorneys for Defendants ADAM GARCIA, JAIME MCGUIRE (sued as Jamie McGuire), and KENNETH HUNTER 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 LOS ANGELES DIVISION 11 JUDY ANNE MIKOVITS, Case No. CV14-08909 SVW (PLA) 12 ADAM GARCIA'S, JAIME 13 Plaintiff, MCGUIRE'S AND KENNETH **HUNTER'S NOTICE OF MOTION** 14 V. AND MOTION TO STRIKE ADAM GARCIA, JAMIE MCGUIRE, PLAINTIFF'S PRAYER FOR RICHARD GAMMICK, GEOFF DEAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 12(f); SUPPORTING THREE UNIDENTIFIED VENTURA 16 COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS, F. HARVEY WHITTEMORE, ANNETTE MEMORANDÚM OF POINTS AND **AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION** 17 F. WHITTEMORE, CARLI WEST OF ROBERT M. DATO KINNE, WHITTEMORE-PETERSON INSTITUTE, a Nevada corporation, UNEVX INC., a Nevada corporation, 18 Date: February 22, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. 19 Courtroom & MICHAEL HILLERBY, KENNETH HUNTER, GREG PARI and VINCENT 20 LOMBARDI. 21 Defendants. 22 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 23 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on February 22, 2016, at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 24 6 of the above entitled court, defendants Adam Garcia, Jaime McGuire (sued as 25 "Jamie McGuire"), and Kenneth Hunter (collectively "the UNR defendants") will 26 and hereby do move the Court to strike Plaintiff Judy Anne Mikovits' prayer for 27

punitive damages (Prayer for Relief, ¶6) from the second amended complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) on the ground that Mikovits fails to allege facts to support an award of punitive damages and the requested relief is not available as a matter of law.

The motion is based on this notice, the supporting memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of Robert M. Dato, all other pleadings on file with the Court in this matter and on any oral argument that the Court may consider at the hearing on the motion. Counsel for defendants Garcia, McGuire, and Hunter sent a "meet and confer" e-mail to Mikovits' counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 on December 22, 2015, but received no response. See Declaration of Robert M. Dato.

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DATED: December 29, 2015

BUCHALTER NEMER

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A Professional Corporation

By: /s/ Robert M. Dato Robert M. Dato Sarah A. Syed

Attorneys for Defendants ADAM GARCIA, JAIME MCGUIRE, and KENNETH HUNTER

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Defendants Adam Garcia, Jaime McGuire (sued as "Jamie McGuire"), and Kenneth Hunter (collectively "the UNR defendants") moved to strike the punitive damages allegations in plaintiff Judy Anne Mikovits' original complaint, and this Court granted the motion giving Mikovits leave to amend. This Court did not rule on the merits of the UNR defendants' motion to strike the punitive damages prayer of the first amended complaint.

The second amended complaint (SAC), however, does not cure the deficiencies of the original or first amended complaints. As demonstrated in the concurrently filed motion to dismiss, the SAC fails to allege any claim for relief against the Defendants. Despite that the SAC alleges no wrongful conduct by the Defendants, Mikovits requests and prays for punitive damages against them.

Even if Mikovits could withstand the motions to dismiss, she certainly has not met her burden of pleading "clear and convincing" facts amounting to "oppression, fraud or malice" to support a punitive damages claim. Even after having had the opportunity to amend her complaint and provide sufficient allegations to support an award of punitive damages, Mikovits has failed to do so.

Therefore, the Court should strike Mikovits' request for punitive damages (Prayer for Relief, ¶ 6) from the SAC.

II. MIKOVITS IS NOT ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. <u>Legal Standard On Motion To Strike</u>

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court may strike from any pleading "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. *Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co.*, 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court may also strike under Rule 12(f) a prayer for relief which is not available

as a matter of law. *Tapley v. Lockwood Green Eng'rs*, 502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1974).

With respect to punitive damages claims, the trial court must evaluate the pleadings with the substantive evidentiary burden of clear and convincing evidence in mind: "Since [the plaintiff's] ultimate burden at trial will be to satisfy the jury by clear and convincing evidence that defendants were guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud ([Cal.] Civ. Code § 3294(a)), then a determination of whether a prima facie case exists will have to be judged by that same standard." *Looney v. Superior Court*, 16 Cal.App.4th 521, 537 (1993); *Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc.*, 78 Cal.App.4th 871, 892 (2000). If the plaintiff is ultimately ever going to prevail on a punitive claim, she can only do so by clear and convincing evidence. *Looney*, 16 Cal.App.4th at 537-540.

B. <u>Mikovits Cannot Recover Punitive Damages</u>

The United States Supreme Court has held that the imposition of punitive damages has constitutional implications requiring evidence of "reprehensibility" equal to criminal conduct. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,* 538 U.S. 408, 417-418 (2003). As such, punitive damage claims are subject to heightened scrutiny at every phase of the action from initial pleadings until final judgment. *Id.* at 416-419; *BMW of North America v. Gore,* 517 U.S. 559, 574-575 (1996). Where the alleged harm is merely financial, "[i]t should be presumed that a plaintiff has been made whole by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should be awarded only if the defendant's culpability is so reprehensible to warrant the imposition further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence." *Id.* at 419; *Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc.*, 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1182-1183 (2007) (analyzing California and U.S. Supreme Court precedents imposing constitutional limits on the pleading and proof of punitive damages claims).

In California, punitive damages are only available against defendants "guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice." Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a); see Greenwich Ins. Co.

v. Rodgers, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2010). A plaintiff alleging a claim for punitive or exemplary damages under section Civil Code section 3294 cannot rest on mere averments of "malicious" and "oppressive" conduct by the defendant. The plaintiff must instead plead **specific facts** which would show the "malicious," "oppressive," or "fraudulent" conduct required to support such an award. Brousseau v. Jarrett, 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (1977).

California decisions interpreting Civil Code Section 3294 make clear that in order to recover punitive damages, the act complained of must not only be intentional, but also accompanied by aggravating circumstances amounting to malice. *Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co.*, 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 328 (1992). The malice requirement implies an act conceived in a spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to others. *Taylor v. Superior Court*, 24 Cal.3d 890, 894 (1979). Mere spite or ill will is not sufficient; and mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. *Ebaugh v. Rabkin*, 22 Cal.App.3d 891, 894-895 (1973).

In striking a punitive damages claim based upon a similarly conclusory complaint as Mikovits' here, the court in *Grieves v. Superior Court*, 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166-167 (1984), explained that "[t]he mere allegation that an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim."

Similarly, in *Brousseau*, *supra*, the court held that plaintiff's conclusory allegations that the defendant acted "intentionally, willfully, fraudulently, and with wanton reckless disregard for the possible injuries" were "patently insufficient" to state a claim for punitive damages under Section 3294. *Brousseau*, *supra*, 73 Cal.App.3d at 872; see also *G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court*, 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 28-29 (1975) (an exemplary award is not satisfied simply by characterizing defendant's conduct as "reckless"); *Cohen v. Groman Mortuary*, 231 Cal.App.2d 1,

8 (1964) (allegations of "wanton" or "willful disregard" are nothing more than legal conclusions); *Hilliard v. A.H. Robbins Co.*, 148 Cal.App.3d 374 (1983) (mere allegation that an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages).

Here, the SAC does not state a claim for punitive damages against the Defendants for at least three reasons.

First, the SAC contains no facts that amount to "criminal reprehensibility" or "oppression, fraud or malice."

Second, the one paragraph in the SAC (para. 173)¹ which contains an allegation that the UNR defendants acted intentionally and with malice is conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.

Third, the SAC fails to even distinguish among the multiple defendants for purposes of determining punitive damages.

The SAC merely demands punitive damages in the prayer for relief without having met the heightened pleading requirements to support an award for punitive damages. This is woefully insufficient to state a claim for punitive damages under California or federal law.

Paragraph 162 within the abuse of process claim also contains an allegation that certain defendants ("HW, AW, WPI and UNEVX") acted intentionally and with malice. The UNR defendants however, are nowhere identified in this claim. To the extent the UNR defendants are included in this claim, paragraph 162 is still insufficient to support a claim of punitive damage because the allegation is simply a legal conclusion devoid of any facts demonstrating malice, oppression or fraud.

CONCLUSION V. Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant this motion and strike Mikovits' request for punitive damages from the Complaint. DATED: December 29, 2015 **BUCHALTER NEMER** A Professional Corporation By: /s/Robert M. Dato Robert M. Dato Sarah A. Syed Attorneys for Defendants ADAM GARCIA, JAIME MCGUIRE, and KENNETH HUNTER

DECLARATION OF ROBERT M. DATO

I, the undersigned Robert M. Dato, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an attorney at law admitted to this Court. I am employed by Buchalter Nemer, PC, counsel of record for defendants Adam Garcia, Jaime McGuire (sued as "Jamie McGuire"), and Kenneth Hunter in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this declaration and am competent to testify about them.
- 2. On December 22, 2015, I sent the following e-mail to Mike Hugo and Rob Liskey, counsel for Plaintiff Judy Mikovits:

Gentlemen:

This email serves as meet and confer efforts with you pursuant to Central District Local Rule 7-3 as to defendants Garcia, McGuire, and Hunter.

I sent a similar e-mail to both of you regarding the first amended complaint. And although the second amended complaint has eliminated much of the hyperbole of the prior versions, there are still various issues that warrant dismissal of these defendants in this action. All of these issues are also discussed in the motions to dismiss the original and first amended complaints. If these defendants are not dismissed from this action, they will move to dismiss your client's second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and/or 12(b)(6) as follows:

1. The Central District of California does not have personal jurisdiction over defendant Hunter. He does not have, nor does the second amended complaint allege, the minimum contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction nor has he purposefully availed himself of California for purposes of special jurisdiction. His declarations in support of the motion to dismiss the original and first amended

complaints were not contradicted in any way.

- 2. The statute of limitations bars at least all your client's federal claims against these defendants. With respect to a section 1983 claim (counts 1-5, liberally construed), the state personal injury statute of limitations, which in California is two years, applies. All of the alleged events occurred on November 18, 2011. The complaint was not filed until November 17, 2014, three years later, and one year after the statute of limitations expired. Although we realize you have pleaded a "continuing violation" theory, none of the authorities relied on in opposition to the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint is on point. If there are additional authorities not cited in that opposition, please forward them to me; I am unaware of any such authority. I am also unaware of authority supporting the theory of a "duty to retract." If there were such authority, there would never be a statute of limitations on a cause of action such as defamation.
- 3. Defendant Hunter was not acting under color of state law for purposes of a section 1983 claim. The allegations of a conspiracy are still conclusory and do not satisfy pleading requirements. Even if Hunter was somehow acting under color of state law, he along with Garcia and McGuire are all protected by the qualified immunity doctrine. The amended complaint does not contain any allegations that Hunter violated any constitutional or statutory right or that no reasonable official would have believed that the purported conduct was lawful. As to Garcia and McGuire, probable cause, and even arguable probable cause, is a defense to liability for an alleged unlawful arrest.
- 4. The amended complaint still does not comply with the heightened pleading standards set forth in Rule 9 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure regarding allegations of fraud (count 8).

Finally, these defendants also intend to move once again to strike the complaint's punitive damages claim (no. 6 in the prayer) as it is not pleaded with the requisite specificity demanded by both the United States and California Supreme Courts.

If you would like to discuss these matters further, please let me know and we can arrange a time to discuss. In the alternative, if (as I suspect) you intend to oppose these defendants' motion to dismiss and to strike, you may so state in a return e-mail.

3. As of the filing of my clients' motions to dismiss and to strike, I have received no response to my e-mail.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Irvine, California on December 29, 2015.

/s/Robert M. Dato
Robert M. Dato

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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3	I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is at
4	BUCHALTER NEMER, A Professional Corporation, 18400 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800, Irvine, California 92612-0514.
5	
6 7	On the date set forth below, I served the foregoing document described as:
8	ADAM GARCIA'S, JAIME MCGUIRE'S AND KENNETH HUNTER'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S
9	PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 12(f); SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT M. DATO
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11	on all other parties and/or their attorney(s) of record to this action as follows:
12	SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
13	BY CM/ECF SYSTEM I certify that I caused a copy of the above
14 15	document to be served upon the following counsel via the court CM/ECF System on December 29, 2015
16	BY MAIL I am readily familiar with the business' practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service.
17	The address(es) shown above is(are) the same as shown on the envelope. The
18	envelope was placed for deposit in the United States Postal Service at Buchalter
19	Nemer in Irvine, California on December 29, 2015. The envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing with first-class prepaid postage on this date
20	following ordinary business practices.
21	I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court
22	at whose direction the service was made. Executed on December 29, 2015 at
23	Irvine, California.
24	Susie Lamarr SISie Laman
25	Susie Lamarr USie Lamar (Signature)
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IRVINE	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

SERVICE LIST 1 JUDY ANNE MIKOVITS v. ADAM GARCIA, et al. 2 USDC CASE NO. CV14-08909 SVW (PLÁ) 3 4 Robert J. Liskey Attorney for Plaintiff Judy Anne The Liskey Law Firm 5 Mikovits 1308 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 232 Email: robliskey@liskeylawfirm.com 6 Pasadena, CA 91106 7 Michael R Hugo, *Pro Hac Vice* Attorney for Plaintiff Judy Anne Law Office of Hugo and Associates 8 Mikovits Email: mike@hugo-law.com LLC 9 1 Catherine Road Framingham, MA 01701 10 Attorneys for Defendant Richard 11 Mary Margaret Kandaras Washoe County District Attorney P. O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520-0027 Gammick 12 Emails: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us 13 tgalli@da.washoecounty.us, cmendoza@da.washoecounty.us 14 15 Brian Warner Hagen Attorneys for Defendants F. Harvey Whittemore, Annette F. Whittemore, Carli West Kinne, Whittemore-Peterson Institute, UNEVX, Inc., Michael Whittemore Law Firm 9432 Double R Boulevard 16 Reno, NV 89501 17 Hillerby and Vincent Lombardi Email: bwhagen@gmail.com 18 James S. Eicher, Jr. Paul B. Beach 19 Attorneys for Defendant Geoff Dean Emails: jeicher@lbaclaw.com pbeach@lbaclaw.com 20 Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, PC 100 W. Broadway, Suite 1200 21 Glendale, CA 91210 22 23 24 25 26 27 BN 17813422v1 UPDATED 9/8/15

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