1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	PAUL B. BEACH, State Bar No. 166265 pbeach@lbaclaw.com JAMES S. EICHER, State Bar No. 213796 jeicher@lbaclaw.com JONATHAN C. MAGNO, State Bar No. 306295 jmagno@lbaclaw.com LAWRENCE BEACH ALLEN & CHOI, PC 100 West Broadway, Suite 1200 Glendale, California 91210-1219 Telephone No. (818) 545-1925 Facsimile No. (818) 545-1937  Attorneys for Defendant Geoff Dean  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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12	JUDY ANNE MIKOVITS,	Case No. CV 14-08909 SVW (PLAx)
13	Plaintiff,	Honorable Stephen V. Wilson
14	vs.	Tionoruo 200 pioni (il vi il dolla
15	ADAM GARCIA, JAMIE MCGUIRE,	DEFENDANT GEOFF DEAN'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
16 17	RICHARD GAMMICK, GEOFF DEAN, THREE UNIDENTIFIED VENTURA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS, F. HARVEY WHITTEMORE, ANNETTE E	MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 12(f), OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DISMISS
18 19	WHITTEMORE, CARLI WEST KINNE, WHITTEMORE-PETERSON ) INSTITUTE, a Nevada corporation, UNEVX INC., a Nevada corporation,	SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6); MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
20	MICHAEL HILLERBY, KENNETH (HUNTER, GREG PARI and VINCENT LOMBARDI,	IN SULLOKT THEREOF
21 22	Defendants.	Date: February 22, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m.
23		Crtm: 6
24	}	[Request for Judicial Notice filed concurrently herewith]
25	)	
26	TO THE CLERK OF COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR	
27	ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:	
28	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 22, 2016, Defendant Sheriff	

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Geoff Dean ("Defendant") will and hereby does move the Court to strike Plaintiff Judy Anne Mikovits' ("Plaintiff") allegations against Defendant in the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f); or in the alternative dismiss the Second Amended Complaint as to Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(f), Defendant is requesting the Court strike all claims and allegations against Defendant Dean on the grounds that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges the same claims and accusations already adjudicated by this Court when granting Summary Judgment for Defendant Dean previously. In the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendant is requesting the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, in its entirety, as to Defendant Dean on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant Dean. The Motion is based on this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice, all of the pleadings on file with the Court in this matter and on any matters that may be brought to the Court to consider at the hearing on the Motion. Counsel for Defendant contacted Plaintiff's counsel on December 22, 2015 detailing the substance of this Motion and potential resolutions, in accordance with Local Rule 7-3. Dated: December 29, 2015 LAWRENCE BEACH ALLEN & CHOI, PC By \_\_\_ /s/ Paul B. Beach Paul B. Beach James S. Eicher, Jr. Jonathan C. Magno Attorneys for Defendant Geoff Dean

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### **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES** 2 3 Federal Cases 4 Arizona v. California, 5 460 U.S. 605(1983)...... 6 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 7 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990)......7 8 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 10 Day v. Moscow, 11 12 Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 13 14 Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 15 275 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2001)......8 16 Ove v. Gwinn, 17 18 Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 19 96 F.Supp.3d 990 (C.D. Cal. 2014)......8 20 U.S. v. Matthews, 21 22 *United States v. Alexander*, 23 106 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1997)..... 24 Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 25 26 27 28

## **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

### I. <u>INTRODUCTION.</u>

On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint and included Ventura County Sheriff Geoff Dean as a defendant despite the Court's previous order granting Summary Judgment as to Sheriff Dean on the identical claims contained within Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

The Court's granting of Summary Judgment in favor is Defendant Dean is now the law of the case, which precludes Plaintiff from bringing identical causes of action against Defendant Dean in her Second Amended Complaint.

### II. PROCEUDRAL HISTORY.

On November 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed a *pro se* Complaint against 12 named defendants, including Defendant Dean, and three unidentified Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs ("VCDS"). Docket ("Dkt.") 1. The Court held a hearing on June, 15, 2015, and dismissed the Complaint, allowing Plaintiff leave to amend. Dkt. 89. On July 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Dkt. 92. On August 13, 2015, Defendant Dean filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 100. On September 7, 2015 Plaintiff filed her Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment along with her Statement of Genuine Disputes. Dkt. 120 and Dkt. 120-1. Also on September 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment. Dkt. 120-2.

On November 24, 2015, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, generously giving Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint as to the other defendants. Dkt. 142.

On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), however, she still named Defendant Dean as a party. Dkt. 144.

In granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court held that:

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Sheriff Dean and VCSO had no role in issuing the criminal complaint or warrant. (Dkt. 142, Page 2).

- Plaintiff's arrest was not made by Sheriff Dean or other VCSO personnel. (Dkt. 142, Page 2).
- Plaintiff was arraigned on Tuesday, November 22, 2011 and represented by an attorney at the hearing. (Dkt. 142, Page 2).
- Plaintiff was given instructions by the court to return to Reno, Nevada and to turn herself in to law enforcement authorities. (Dkt. 142, Page 2).
- The charges against Plaintiff in Nevada were subsequently dismissed. (Dkt. 142, Page 2).
- Though Plaintiff alleges that she was not photographed, not informed of her charges, denied access to counsel, and not seen by a magistrate immediately,...these claims are contradicted by other evidence....Dean provided Plaintiff with a photograph taken from her booking which she claims, without any evidentiary support, is in fact a forgery...Dean also represents that he has provided Plaintiff with her fingerprint card and the audio recordings of multiple telephone calls made while she was in VCSO custody. (Dkt. 142, Page 4).

As a result, this Court concluded:

- Plaintiff had not introduced admissible evidence that could lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Sheriff Dean was involved in a larger plot against Plaintiff. (Dkt. 142, Page 3).
- Plaintiff's allegations of processing irregularities were speculative, if not directly controverted. (Dkt. 142, Page 4).
- Plaintiff's uncontroverted allegations, at best, only established that her time in jail was unpleasant and that she was not processed as fast as she could have been. This, however, did not raise a reasonable inference

that Sheriff Dean violated Plaintiff's rights or had any involvement with a conspiracy. (Dkt. 142, Page 4).

- Plaintiff's unsupported allegations regarding phone calls received by Plaintiff's husband while Plaintiff was in VCSO custody were not sufficient to authorize the extensive discovery that Plaintiff sought to uncover whether Sheriff Dean had some connection with the alleged conspiracy. (Dkt. 142, Page 4).
- Plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled by California Government Code Section 945.3 was not applicable to the facts of this case. (Dkt. 142, Page 5).
- The uncontroverted evidence established that Plaintiff's claim against Sheriff Dean was time barred. (Dkt. 142, Page 3).
- There was no genuine issue of material fact and no reasonable fact finder could find against Dean. (Dkt. 142, Page 5).
- Defendant Dean's motion for summary judgment is granted. (Dkt. 142, Page 6).

Despite this Court's granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has re-alleged the same claims and accusations against the Defendant that have already been adjudicated.

# III. <u>LEGAL ARGUMENT</u>.

A. THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT DEAN UNDER RULE
12(f) DUE TO THEM BEING REDUNDANT, IMMATERIAL, AND
IMPERTINENT BASED ON THE COURT'S PRIOR RULING.

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(f) provides in pertinent part, "Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading...the court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

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matter." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). "Immaterial" matters are those which have no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief; "impertinent" matters are statements that do not pertain and are not necessary to the issues in question. See, Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (upheld the striking of allegations based on them being barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata). overruled on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023 (1994). A motion to strike is the primary method of reaching defects or objections to a pleading that cannot be addressed by a motion to dismiss. While it can be used to attack an entire pleading, it is more often used to attack portions thereof—i.e., even single words or phrases. See, Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527; Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2nd Cir. 1992). Based upon the prior granting of Summary Judgment for Defendant Dean, Defendant requests that paragraphs 17, 72, 110, 128, 128, 135-137, 139, 142-144, 146, 149, 152, 154, 156, 158, and 160 of Plaintiff's SAC be stricken as to naming Defendant Dean or his agents as a party, based on them being redundant, immaterial, and impertinent. Further, Defendant Dean requests that his name be stricken from the Caption of the SAC, the heading on page 14, which states, "SHERIFF DEAN," and the heading on page 18, which states, "SHERRIF DEAN" (sic). Defendant also requests that paragraphs 13, 75, 93-99, 114, and 133(c-e) of Plaintiff's SAC be stricken, in their entirety, based on them being duplicative allegations which the Court has already adjudicated, making them redundant, immaterial, and impertinent.

Plaintiff's SAC has duplicated many of her FAC's claims and accusations as to Defendant Dean. As seen in "Exhibit 1", attached to this Motion, nearly all of the paragraphs that either name or make allegations against Defendant Dean in Plaintiff's FAC are identical in her SAC. These duplicated allegations found in

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the SAC have already been adjudicated, as reflected in the Court's granting of Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion. Dkt. 142. The Court's ruling held, in part, "Plaintiff's uncontroverted allegations, at best, only established that her time in jail was unpleasant and that she was not processed as fast as she could have been. This, however, did not raise a reasonable inference that Sheriff Dean violated Plaintiff's rights or had any involvement with a conspiracy." (Emphasis added). Dkt. 142, page 4. Further, the Court ruled, "There is no genuine issue of material fact and no reasonable fact finder could find against Dean." (Emphasis added). Dkt. 142, page 5. In addition, Plaintiff has included allegations involving Defendant Dean, specifically paragraphs 93-94 and 96-99 of the SAC, which should also be stricken in their entirety. These claims and allegations against Defendant Dean, while not previously set forth in the FAC, have already been addressed by the Court in granting Summary Judgment for Defendant Dean. In paragraphs 93-94, Plaintiff alleges that when she was stopped for speeding and a state trooper told her that her record was clean this is evidence of a claimed conspiracy. However, Plaintiff already made the same allegation in her Affidavit to Oppose Motion of Summary Judgment. Dkt. 120-2, paragraphs 29-31. After reviewing this Affidavit this Court held, as stated above, that there is no reasonable inference that Defendant Dean had violated Plaintiff's rights or was involved in a conspiracy. Dkt. 142, page 4. In regard to paragraphs 96-99 of the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that threats by Defendant Dean's counsel and a fraudulent booking photograph are further evidence of a conspiracy and wire-fraud involving Defendant Dean. The Court, however, already made it clear that, as to the booking photograph, "Dean provided Plaintiff with a photograph taken from her booking which she claims, without any evidentiary support, is in fact a forgery." (Emphasis added). Dkt.

142, page 4. Plaintiff has failed to provide any additional factual support to bolster her claim.

Further, in paragraph 96 of the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that the "most solid evidence of a conspiracy and wire-fraud" involving Defendant Dean came from his counsel's purported threats against Plaintiff unless she dismissed her civil claims. Such a claim is unfounded and irrelevant as to Defendant Dean being involved in any conspiracy. The allegations found in these paragraphs do not provide any additional support for Plaintiff's implied request that this Court look beyond its holding. Thus, these allegations and claims against Defendant Dean, as listed in paragraphs 93-94 and 96-99, should be stricken in their entirety as being immaterial and impertinent.

Finally, Defendant requests that all these claims, accusations, and allegations listed above against Defendant Dean in Plaintiff's SAC be stricken due to the Court's holding, in granting Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion, that, "The uncontroverted evidence established that Plaintiff's claim against Sheriff Dean was time barred." (Emphasis added). Dkt. 142, Page 3. Based on this holding, which enforces the statute of limitations, all duplicative allegations against Defendant Dean are immaterial and impertinent since the Plaintiff has failed to provide any additional evidentiary support that would enable her to bring a valid and timely claim against Defendant Dean.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant Dean requests that the Court strike all claims, accusations, and allegations against him from the Plaintiff's SAC.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For the convenience of the Court, Defendant Dean attaches as Exhibit 2 a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with the specific portions lined out that Defendant requests stricken.

# B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, UNDER RULE 12(b)(6), DEFENDANT REQUESTS THE COURT DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, AS TO ALL ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT DEAN, BASED UPON THIS COURT'S PRIOR HOLDING WHICH IS NOW THE LAW OF THE CASE.

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) provides that an action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A complaint properly states a claim that can overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only when it gives the defendant "fair notice" of the claim and the "grounds upon which it rests", and when the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, state a "plausible" claim for relief. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Conclusory allegations of law or unwarranted inferences of fact urged by the nonmoving party are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. *Ove v. Gwinn*, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, a court's obligation to construe allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party does not mean that those allegations must be construed in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, if such a construction cannot reasonably be made. *Id.* Moreover, dismissal is proper if there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Court has already held, among other things, in the granting of Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion that: (1) Plaintiff failed to raise a reasonable inference that Sheriff Dean violated Plaintiff's rights or had any involvement with a conspiracy; (2) Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Dean are time barred; and (3) there is no genuine issue of material fact and no reasonable fact finder could find against Dean. Dkt. 142.

Based on the holdings of the Court, which acts as the law of the case, the continued claims and allegations against Defendant Dean should be dismissed. The "law of the case" doctrine generally precludes a court from "reconsidering an issue that already has been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case." United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997); Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 990 (C.D. Cal. 2014). A judgment of the district court, until it is set aside or reversed, is the law of the case. In general, the "law of the case" doctrine contemplates that a legal decision made at one stage of proceedings should remain the law of that case throughout the litigation unless and until the decision is modified or overruled by a higher court. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605(1983). Thus, pursuant to the law of the case, a court will generally refuse to reconsider an issue that has already been decided by the same court or a higher court in the same case. Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 275 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2001); *U.S. v. Matthews*, 643 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff has re-alleged the same constitutional claims in her SAC as

Here, Plaintiff has re-alleged the same constitutional claims in her SAC as she did in her FAC. As discussed above, in granting Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion, the Court held that, "Plaintiff's uncontroverted allegations, at best, only established that her time in jail was unpleasant and that she was not processed as fast as she could have been. This, however, did not raise a reasonable inference that Sheriff Dean violated Plaintiff's rights or had any involvement with a conspiracy."

It is unclear why Plaintiff has chosen to ignore the Court and its Order granting Defendant Dean's Summary Judgment Motion. Plaintiff's SAC attempts to re-allege the same claims against Sheriff Dean that were previously ruled upon by the Court. Not only did the Court hold that no reasonable fact-finder could rule against Defendant Dean, but the Court also found that Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Dean are time barred. The Court's Order granting summary

judgment for Sheriff Dean is the law of the case and should now preclude Plaintiff from renewing the same claims against Defendant Dean in her SAC. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim in her SAC against Defendant Dean on which relief can be granted. IV. **CONCLUSION.** For the forgoing reasons, Defendant Dean respectfully submits that his Motion be granted and that any allegations against Sheriff Dean be stricken from Plaintiff's SAC, or, in the alternative, Plaintiff's SAC be dismissed as to Defendant Dean without leave to amend. LAWRENCE BEACH ALLEN & CHOI, PC Dated: December 29, 2015 /s/ Paul B. Beach Paul B. Beach James S. Eicher, Jr. Jonathan C. Magno Attorneys for Defendant